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Best Brief, Appellee-Cross-Appellant 
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YOCHANAN ZAKAI & JIM DIVERDE 
C.A. No. 11-1245 
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STATE OF NEW UNION, 
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v. 
UNITED STATES, 
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v. 
STATE OF PROGRESS, 
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On Appeal from the Order of the United States District Court  
for the District of New Union, 
Civ. No. 148-2011, Dated June 2, 2011 
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       * This brief has been reprinted in its original form.  Please note that the 
Table of Authorities and Table of Contents for this brief have been omitted. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 (2006) and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 
(2006).  On June 2, 2011 the district court granted the United 
States’ motion for summary judgment, noting that the plaintiff 
has no standing.  The States of New Union and Progress each 
filed a timely notice of appeal.  The district court’s order is a final 
decision, and this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I.   Whether the State of New Union has standing in its 
sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of the 
groundwater in the state or in its parens patriae capacity as 
protector of its citizens who have an interest in the 
groundwater in the state. 
 
II.   Whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(“Corps”) has jurisdiction to issue a permit under Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”) § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006), because 
Lake Temp is navigable water under CWA §§ 301(a), 404(a), 
and 402(7), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(7). 
 
III.   Whether the Corps has jurisdiction to issue a permit under 
CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, or the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) has jurisdiction to issue a permit 
under CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 for the discharge of 
slurry into Lake Temp. 
 
IV.   Whether the decision by the Office of Management and 
Budget (“OMB”) that the Corps had jurisdiction under CWA 
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, and that EPA did not have 
jurisdiction under CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, to issue a 
permit for the Department of Defense (“DOD”) to discharge 
slurry into Lake Temp and EPA’s decision violated the 
CWA. 
 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/4
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The DOD was issued a permit by the Corps under CWA § 404 
to discharge a slurry of spent munitions into Lake Temp.  
Situated on military property, Lake Temp is a lake located 
completely within the State of Progress.  The lake measures three 
miles wide and nine miles long during years with more rain.  It is 
smaller in dry seasons, and dries up once every five years on 
average.  Lake Temp attracts boaters who enjoy duck hunting on 
the opposite side of the lake from the only road in the area.  A 
significant portion of these hunters and boaters travel across 
state lines. 
The State of New Union filed suit, arguing that the discharge 
project required a permit from EPA under CWA § 402 rather 
than a § 404 permit from the Corps.  The State of Progress 
intervened in the case, and then all parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The district court granted the United 
States’ motion for summary judgment on June 2, 2011, finding 
that New Union lacks standing to bring suit and providing an 
opinion on the merits of the case as well.  New Union and 
Progress appeal this decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court properly granted summary judgment on 
the United States’ motion and was correct in denying New 
Union’s motion. 
As a threshold issue, the State of New Union lacks standing 
to challenge the Corps’ jurisdiction to issue a CWA permit.  New 
Union has not demonstrated standing pursuant to the 
requirements of Article III, particularly its injury requirement.  
Additionally, New Union is estopped from challenging the permit, 
because it failed to object to DOD’s EIS. 
The district court properly decided that Lake Temp is subject 
to CWA jurisdiction because it is “within the description of water 
bodies that have traditionally been held to be navigable.”  In the 
alternative, the lakebed where the project will take place meets 
the significant nexus test and thus is subject to CWA jurisdiction.  
Additionally, Lake Temp satisfies the continuous surface 
connection test because it is a relatively permanent body of water 
3
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forming a lake.  Thus, the district court’s decision regarding the 
navigability of Lake Temp should be affirmed. 
Third, the district court properly held that the Corps has 
authority to issue discharge permits under § 404, and both the 
Corps’ and EPA’s interpretations are consistent with this 
understanding of the statute.  Additionally, the slurry that DOD 
proposes to discharge falls squarely within the definition of fill 
material that both agencies have promulgated.  As a result, the 
district court was correct in holding that the permit was properly 
issued under § 404. 
Finally, EPA’s decision not to veto the permit did not violate 
the CWA because the statute mandated consultation with the 
Corps.  In the alternative, the decision is not subject to judicial 
review because it is a discretionary agency decision not to bring 
an enforcement action.  If the decision is subject to judicial 
review, it was not arbitrary or capricious. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions of law are evaluated by this Court and should be 
reviewed de novo. Theriot, Inc. v. United States, 245 F.3d 388, 395 
(5th Cir. 1998).  Review of federal agency action is governed by 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006), and can 
be overturned if the action: 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, 
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that is could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or to the product of agency 
expertise. 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/4
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD 
THAT NEW UNION DOES NOT HAVE 
STANDING TO CONTEST THE CORPS’ 
ISSUANCE OF A CWA PERMIT. 
 
The State of New Union has not established Article III 
standing requirements to challenge the CWA § 404 permit issued 
by the Corps.  Specifically, New Union has not suffered an injury 
under traditional Article III standing requirements, or under the 
majority’s relaxed standard in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007).  Moreover, New Union should be estopped from 
seeking judicial review of the Corps’ decision to issue a § 404 
discharge permit because it failed to object to concerns in the EIS 
prepared by the Corps. 
A .  New Union does not meet Article III standing 
requirements. 
Federal-court jurisdiction is limited to “Cases” and 
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  Limiting federal 
jurisdiction to proper cases and controversies ensures that the 
Federal Judiciary respects “the proper . . . role of the courts in a 
democratic society.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) 
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)) (internal 
quotation omitted).  When a party invoking federal jurisdiction 
fails to demonstrate a proper case or controversy, “courts have no 
business deciding it, or expounding the law in the business of 
doing so.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 
(2006).  Thus, the doctrine of standing serves to identify 
appropriate matters for judicial resolution and is a core 
component of the Article III case or controversy requirements. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
To establish standing, the Constitution requires that a 
plaintiff bringing a suit in federal court satisfy three elements. 
Id. at 560.  First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it has 
suffered an injury that is concrete and particularized and actual 
and imminent. Id.  Additionally, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant. Id.  Finally, 
5
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the plaintiff must demonstrate it is likely, and not merely 
speculative, that a favorable decision from the court would 
provide redress for the injury. Id.  The State of New Union has 
not met this burden.1 
B.  New Union’s claimed injury is neither actual nor 
imminent under the traditional standing test, or 
the relaxed standard from Massachusetts. 
New Union claims its injury is the potential contamination of 
the Imhoff Aquifer.  But New Union has not offered any facts to 
show that it will suffer an injury that is actual or imminent.  
Proving an injury-in-fact requires more than showing injury to a 
cognizable interest. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.  It also requires 
showing that the party seeking relief is among those actually 
injured. Id.  Moreover, the injury must be “real and immediate.” 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the imminence requirement 
in Lujan offers a useful illustration for the case at bar. 504 U.S. 
at 563-64.  The plaintiff in Lujan, organizations dedicated to 
wildlife preservation, offered affidavits from two of its members 
to show injury. Id. at 563.  These members traveled to Egypt and 
Sri Lanka to view animals on the endangered species list. Id.  
The same members alleged they were injured by development 
projects that would increase the rate of those animals becoming 
extinct, with the result being that the members would have a 
more difficult time viewing the animals on return trips. Id.  The 
respondents in that case were unable to show injury, though, 
because neither member of the wildlife organization was able to 
specify definitive plans to go return to Egypt or Sri Lanka. Id. at 
563-64. 
The Lujan court rejected the respondents’ claim of injury for 
failing the actual or imminent test. Id. at 564.  According to the 
court, professing an “inten[t] to return to the places they had 
 
 1. Nor does New Union benefit from bringing its suit under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).  “Congress may grant an 
express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential 
standing rules.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 501.  Nonetheless, a federal statute cannot 
relieve a party bringing suit from showing the Article III requirements. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/4
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visited . . . is simply not enough.” Id (internal quotation omitted).  
A lack of concrete plans or “specification of when the some day 
will be do[es] not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ 
injury that our cases require.” Id.  The respondents were unable 
to show through “specific facts” that their members would be 
directly affected by the actions of the appellant. Id. at 563. 
New Union also claims that it has a special interest as an 
affected state, attempting to invoke the more relaxed test for 
standing found in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518-20, but 
it does not even meet this relaxed standard.  There, the court 
indicated that Massachusetts was “entitled to special solicitude” 
in determining whether or not it met Article III standing 
requirements. Id. at 520.  Massachusetts claimed injury would 
result from rising sea levels that would swallow the state’s 
coastal property. Id. at 522-23.  According to the majority that 
decided the case, states are not “normal litigants for the purpose 
of invoking federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 518.  The majority 
concluded that states have an independent interest in their 
quasi-sovereign capacity. Id. 
Notwithstanding the fact that four of the justices dissented 
from the majority’s view that states are subject to a relaxed 
standing test, the majority in Massachusetts relied on many more 
specific facts alleging injury than New Union offers in this case.  
For example, the petitioners in Massachusetts offered statements 
that “qualified scientific experts [had] reached a strong 
consensus” that global warming would cause injury by raising sea 
levels. Id. at 521 (internal quotation omitted).  Additionally, the 
petitioners offered facts to show that sea levels had already 
begun to rise. Id. at 522. 
As a result, New Union cannot show that it has suffered an 
injury, because it has not offered specific facts sufficient to meet 
the traditional Article III standing analysis or the relaxed 
standard from Massachusetts.  The DOD munitions project has 
not started, thus New Union must rely on showing an imminent 
threat of injury.  New Union hypothesizes that contaminated 
water from the munitions project will reach the Imhoff Aquifer on 
the bare fact that land between the aquifer and Lake Temp is 
primarily unconsolidated alluvial fill. Order at 5.  But aside from 
that conclusory statement, New Union has not offered further 
7
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evidence to prove that contaminants will ever reach the portion of 
the aquifer below its soil. Order at 5-6. 
Moreover, New Union claims that it can collect information 
to track the movement of pollutants with the installation of 
monitoring wells. Id. at 6.  However, New Union to date has not 
filed an application with DOD for permission to do so. Id.  Unlike 
the concrete facts of scientific consensus and rising seal levels 
that the petitioners in Massachusetts were able to offer, New 
Union has offered nothing more than circumstantial evidence 
that pollutants from the munitions project might one day reach 
the Imhoff Aquifer.  Accordingly, New Union has not met its 
standing requirements requiring injury in fact. 
C.  Nor Does New Union have standing under a theory 
of parens patriae. 
Causes of action under the parens patriae theory are rooted 
in the common-law concept of the “royal prerogative.” Snapp & 
Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).  The royal 
prerogative included the right or responsibility to take care of 
persons unable to take care of themselves. Id.  “This prerogative 
of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State 
[and] is . . . often necessary to be exercised in the interests of 
humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot 
protect themselves.” Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 
57 (1890). 
However, the current concept of parens patriae standing as it 
has developed in American law is different from that common-law 
approach. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 600.  Parens patriae 
standing is separate from an allegation of injury under Article 
III. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448-449 (1992).  
“[T]o maintain [a parens patriae] action, the State must 
articulate an interest apart from the interest of particular private 
parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party.” 
Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607.  The Supreme Court in Snapp 
referred to this as a “quasi-sovereign interest[,]” one of which 
concerned the physical and economic well-being of its citizens.  
Id.  In Snapp, the Supreme Court allowed a parens patriae action 
for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to assert federally created 
rights against private defendants. Id. at 610 n.16.  In contrast, 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/4
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however, “[a] State does not have standing as parens patriae to 
bring an action against the Federal Government.” Massachusetts 
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-486 (1923).  According to the Court 
in Mellon, it is not within a State’s power to enforce rights 
against the federal government. Id.  “In that field it is the United 
States, and not the State, which represents them as parens 
patriae.” Id. at 486. 
New Union seeks to enforce the rights of the rancher Dale 
Bompers, who claims the value of his ranch will be diminished if 
the aquifer is contaminated. Order at 6.  As stated above, though, 
New Union cannot bring a parens patriae action against the 
government.  Even if New Union were able to bring a parens 
patriae action against the federal government, it would still be 
unable to demonstrate that Dale Bompers has suffered an injury.  
His property lies over the Imhoff Aquifer, but he does not draw 
water from there and has no definite plans to use it in the future. 
Id.  It is hard to see exactly how Dale Bompers suffers any actual 
or imminent injury at all.  Furthermore, New Union has not 
alleged facts that allege the aquifer is currently being used or will 
be by residents of the state.  The water in the aquifer is not 
potable or able to be used for agricultural purposes.  It follows, 
then, that New Union is unable to meet standing requirements 
under a theory of parens patriae. 
 
D.  New Union’s failure to object to issues that should 
have been raised in the EIS process estopps it 
from seeking judicial review of the Corps’ decision 
to issue § 404 permit. 
Allowing New Union to proceed with this suit without raising 
objections to the EIS circumvents the procedures set out in 
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370H, for resolving objections to the 
proposed munitions project.  Facing an analogous situation, the 
Supreme Court stated in Department of Transportation v. Public 
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764 (2004), “[p]ersons challenging an 
agency’s compliance with NEPA must structure their 
participation so that it . . . alerts the agency to the [parties’] 
positions and contentions.”  Doing so allows an agency to “give 
the issue meaningful consideration.” Id. 
9
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The underlying policy of this rule is to prevent courts from 
substituting their “judgment for that of the agency on matters 
where the agency has not had an opportunity to make a factual 
record or apply its expertise.” New Mexico Environmental Imp. 
Div. v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 825, 835 (10th Cir. 1986).  
Considerations of governmental efficiency necessitates that 
courts respect agency decisions “unless the administrative body 
not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the 
time appropriate under its practice.” United States v. L.A. Tucker 
Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952).  But see City of 
Seabrook, Tex. v. United States EPA, 659 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (5th 
Cir.1981) (holding that plaintiffs are not required to comment or 
participate before challenging agency action).2 
Here, the Corps followed standard NEPA procedures and 
followed public notice requirements throughout the EIS process. 
Order at 6.  Moreover, all relevant information concerning Lake 
Temp and the Imhoff Aquifer at issue in the district court order 
was included in the EIS. Id.  Despite those efforts, the State of 
New Union failed to make any objection to the EIS. Id.  As a 
result, considerations of fairness and respect for the Corps’ 
decision to issue the permit require that New Union’s claims 
against it be estopped. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DECIDED 
THAT LAKE TEMP IS SUBJECT TO CWA 
JURISDICTION. 
The CWA provides the Corps jurisdiction to issue permits for 
the discharge of dredge or fill material into navigable waters. 
CWA § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344.  The term navigable waters is 
defined as “waters of the United States.” CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(7).  The Supreme Court issued a fractured opinion in 
 
 2. City of Seabrook held that potential litigants generally should not be 
estopped based on failure to object during a notice and comment period. Id. at 
1360-61.  However, that rule presupposes that objecting during the notice and 
comment period preserves a right to contest an agency action. Big Horn Coal Co. 
v. Temple, 793 F.2d 1165, 1170 (1986) (Barrett, J., specially concurring).  The 
concurrence instead reasoned that a litigant should be estopped from objecting 
to an agency action unless the litigant can demonstrate it is constitutionally 
infirm or in excess of statutory authority. Id.  Neither of those exceptions are 
the case here. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/4
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Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), that guides the 
interpretation of the term “waters of the United States.”  An 
opinion authored by Justice Scalia for a four-vote plurality 
established a “continuous surface connection” test. Id. at 730-39.  
A concurrence by Justice Kennedy established a “significant 
nexus” test. Id. at 779-84 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The four 
dissenting Justices argued for jurisdiction under either of two 
tests, and in other instances as well.  Id. at 787-810 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
The holding of the district court, and the correct application 
of the CWA to Lake Temp, is not based on either of the Rapanos 
tests, but a definition of navigable waters that all the Supreme 
Court Justices agree on.  Thus, this Court need not reach a 
decision on the Rapanos split to resolve this case. 
A. The district court correctly held that Lake Temp is 
“within the description of water bodies that have 
traditionally been held to be navigable.” 
The entire Supreme Court agrees that the term “navigable 
waters” encompasses something more than traditionally 
“navigable-in-fact” waters, thus Lake Temp is properly classified 
as a navigable-in-fact water.  Id. at 731 (plurality opinion); id. at 
767 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army 
Corps Of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001); United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985); United 
States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2007).  The 
traditional definition established in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 
563 (1870), is that waters must be used or susceptible of use, in 
their ordinary condition, as a highway for commerce in the 
customary modes of trade and travel.  The waters do not need to 
be open to navigation “at all seasons of the year, or at all stages of 
the water.” Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 
113, 122 (1921).  In Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971), 
the Supreme Court held that the Great Salt Lake was navigable 
in fact because “nine boats [were] used from time to time to haul 
cattle and sheep from the mainland to” an island.  Despite the 
fact that the Great Salt Lake was not a part of an interstate or 
11
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international commercial highway, “[t]he lake was used as 
highway and that is the gist of the federal test.” Id. 
Similarly, the district court found that Lake Temp is a part 
of a highway of interstate commerce used by out-of-state hunters 
who boat and paddle canoes on the lake.  Lake Temp meets The 
Daniel Ball test because “for over one hundred years” the lake 
has been used, in its ordinary condition, as a highway for boaters 
traveling from out of state to hunt birds on a shore with no road 
access. Order at 7.  It is not significant that Lake Temp shrinks 
in dry years because waters do not need to be navigable “at all 
season of the year” to be navigable in fact. Econ. Light & Power, 
256 U.S. at 122. 
Moreover, Lake Temp is more closely connected to interstate 
commerce than the Great Salt Lake in Utah v. United States.  In 
Utah, the lake was not “a navigable highway in the customary 
sense of the word” because no commercial operator ran a 
shipping, ferry, or barge operation. 403 U.S. at 11.  Similarly, 
Lake Temp is not used to ship commercial goods in interstate 
commerce.  Yet, because a few boats used from time to time to 
haul intrastate livestock over a lake satisfies The Daniel Ball test, 
so too does Lake Temp’s long history of use by interstate hunters.  
Thus, Lake Temp meets the traditional definition of a navigable-
in-fact water. 
B.  The lakebed, where the Corps’ project will take 
place, is subject to CWA jurisdiction. 
CWA jurisdiction extends to Lake Temp’s ordinary high 
water mark, and thus includes dry sections of the lakebed.  The 
CWA provides that the federal government can substitute state 
for federal jurisdiction over “navigable waters . . . other than 
those waters which are . . . susceptible to use in their natural 
condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport 
interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high 
water mark.” CWA § 404(g)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (emphasis 
added).  By denying state jurisdiction over navigable waters 
“shoreward to their ordinary high water mark,” Congress 
intended to retain federal CWA jurisdiction over the area 
between the shore and high water mark of waters susceptible to 
use in interstate commerce. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/4
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(Plurality opinion interpreting CWA jurisdiction over navigable 
waters based upon this subsection of the act); id. at 768 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (interpreting CWA jurisdiction over 
navigable waters based on this clause).  Because Congress 
inserted a provision retaining federal jurisdiction over these 
areas, it follows that Congress intended these areas to be a part 
of federal CWA jurisdiction in the first place. 
The CWA grants federal jurisdiction to navigable waters 
below their ordinary high water mark.  A lakebed is defined as 
the “bottom of a lake.” New Oxford American Dictionary 948 
(Erin McKean ed., 2d ed., 2005).  The bottom is below the high 
water mark, and the proposed activity will take place on the 
lakebed of Lake Temp. Order at 4.  Thus, the proposed activity on 
the lakebed is subject to CWA jurisdiction. 
C. In the alternative, if the Court finds that the lake 
is navigable in fact and the dry portions of the 
lakebed are not a part of the lake, then the dry 
portions of the lakebed meet the significant nexus 
test. 
If the court finds that Lake Temp is navigable under The 
Daniel Ball test, but that the dry portions of the lakebed are not 
a part of the lake, then the dry portions are subject to CWA 
jurisdiction as adjacent wetlands under the significant nexus test.  
Here again, the Court may come to this decision without reaching 
the issue of which interpretation of Rapanos to embrace.  Two 
Circuit Court interpretations of the Rapanos decision exist: the 
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits concluded that the significant 
nexus test alone creates CWA jurisdiction, while the First and 
Eighth Circuits concluded that either creates CWA jurisdiction.  
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 
(7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 
(11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 62–64 
(1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th 
Cir. 2009).  No part in this case asserts, and no circuit court has 
held that the plurality test alone creates jurisdiction.  Thus, this 
court may conclude that CWA jurisdiction exists under the 
significant nexus test without deciding if the plurality’s 
continuous surface connection test is also applicable. See Precon 
13
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Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 288 (4th 
Cir. 2011); Northern Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 
781 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing CWA jurisdiction under the 
significant nexus test while reserving judgment on CWA 
jurisdiction under the continuous surface connection test). 
A wetland meets the “significant nexus” test if, “either alone 
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, [it] 
significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as 
‘navigable.’” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Addressing a Corps standard that provides for jurisdiction over 
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, Justice Kennedy 
recognized that “the Corps’s conclusive standard for jurisdiction 
rests upon a reasonable inference of ecologic interconnection, and 
the assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable 
under the Act by showing adjacency alone.” Id.  Later, he again 
reiterated that “[w]hen the Corps seeks to regulate wetlands 
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, it may rely on adjacency to 
establish its jurisdiction.” Id. at 782. 
No party disputes that the area to be sprayed is directly next 
to, or adjacent to, Lake Temp.  Thus, if the Court finds that Lake 
Temp is a navigable water, then it follows that the adjacent 
lakebed is within the jurisdiction of the CWA because the 
adjacent area meets the significant nexus test. 
D. In the alternative, if the Court finds that the lake 
is not navigable in fact, than either of the Rapanos 
tests may be used to establish jurisdiction. 
In the alternative, the United States asserts that under 
Rapanos, either Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test or the 
plurality’s continuous surface connection test can be used to 
establish jurisdiction under the CWA.  This interpretation is 
supported by Justice Stevens in his dissent: “Given that all four 
Justices who have joined this [dissent] would uphold the Corps’ 
jurisdiction in [all] cases in which either the plurality’s or Justice 
Kennedy’s test is satisfied—on remand each of the judgments 
should be reinstated if either of those tests is met.” Id. at 810 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).  The circuit courts 
that held otherwise rest their reasoning on United States v. 
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Marks, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), where the Supreme Court held 
that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds” (citations omitted) (internal quotation omitted).  In the 
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ analysis, the significant nexus 
test is the “narrowest grounds” for restricting federal jurisdiction.  
Gerke, 464 F.3d at 724-25; Robison, 505 F.3d at 1221-22. 
Following the dissent’s instruction will yield a result that 
most closely follows what would happen if the Supreme decided 
each case before it.  If the waters at issue meet the significant 
nexus test, then the four members of the dissent in Rapanos and 
Justice Kennedy would vote to uphold jurisdiction under the 
CWA.  If the waters at issue meet the continuous surface 
connection test, then the four members of the dissent and the 
four members of the plurality in Rapanos would vote to uphold 
jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court, voting on each test 
individually, would allow CWA jurisdiction under either test, 
thus this Circuit should follow the First and Eighth Circuits in 
adopting the Rapanos dissent’s instruction and allow CWA 
jurisdiction under either test. 
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ reasoning is not 
compelling because it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
which test upholds jurisdiction on a narrower ground. Bailey, 571 
F.3d at 798 (“Because there is little overlap between the 
plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s opinions, it is difficult to 
determine which holding is the narrowest.”).  Narrower grounds 
can be characterized as a test that restricts federal jurisdiction in 
a subset of the situations under which the other test restricts 
federal jurisdiction. See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63. 
The “narrower grounds” rationale is not applicable here 
because one test in Rapanos is not a subset of the other.  There 
are certain waters, for example, a small creek with a continuous 
surface connection to a large navigable water, that would be 
subject to CWA jurisdiction under the continuous surface 
connection test, but possibly not under the significant nexus test.  
On the other hand, a large area of wetlands upstream from a 
traditionally navigable body of water likely has a significant 
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nexus with that body of water.  Yet if the wetlands do not contain 
a surface connection to the body of water, CWA jurisdiction will 
not attach under the plurality’s test.  Accordingly, the one test 
cannot be viewed as “narrower grounds” than the other because 
neither is a subset of the other.  The term narrowest grounds “as 
used in Marks does not translate easily to [Rapanos].  The cases 
in which Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction are not 
a subset of the cases in which the plurality would limit 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 64.3  Accordingly, Marks is not an appropriate 
standard to decide CWA jurisdiction in the wake of Rapanos. 
If the Court finds that the lake is not navigable in fact, then 
following Justice Sevens’ instruction either of the Rapanos tests 
may be used to establish CWA jurisdiction.  Following Marks is 
not compelling because it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine which test upholds jurisdiction on narrower grounds.  
Following the dissent’s instruction will yield a result that mirrors 
what would happen if the Supreme adjudicated each fact pattern 
that emerges. 
E.  Lake Temp is a relatively permanent body of 
water and thus meets the Rapanos plurality’s test. 
The plurality’s test: 
requires two findings: first, that the . . . channel contains a 
‘wate[r] of the United States,’ (i.e., a relatively permanent body of 
water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and 
second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection 
with that water, making it difficult to determine where the 
‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins. 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.  Lake Temp meets the first part of the 
plurality’s test, and the second part of this test is not applicable 
to Lake Temp because it is a lake and not wetlands. 
The first part of the plurality’s test requires that the lake be 
a “relatively permanent, standing . . . body of water forming [a] 
geographic feature[] described in ordinary parlance as [a] lake.”  
Id. at 732.  “At bare minimum, [this includes] the ordinary 
 
 3. The Johnson Court additionally cited confusion regarding what exactly 
the term “narrowest grounds” means. 467 F.3d at 63. 
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presence of water.” Id. at 734.  The outer bounds of the plurality’s 
test is set out in footnote 5 of the Court’s decision: “[C]hannels 
containing permanent flow are plainly within the definition, and 
[intermittent or ephemeral streams] whose flow is [c]oming and 
going at intervals[, b]roken, fitful, or existing only, or no longer 
than, a day; diurnal[,] short-lived, are not.” Id. at 733 n.5 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Lake Temp meets all the elements of this test.  The lake is an 
established feature of the area, having been used by boaters for 
over one hundred years, and thus is “relatively permanent.”  
Additionally, no party disputes Lake Temp’s status as a lake; its 
name and depiction on maps lends credibility to this view.  
Accordingly, the lake is a geographic feature described in 
ordinary parlance as a lake.  The lake is only dry approximately 
one out of every five years, thus Lake Temp ordinarily includes 
the presence of water.  Finally, Lake Temp falls within the outer 
bounds of the test as described in footnote 5 of the Court’s 
decision because it is normally flowing and dries out only, on 
average, twice a decade. 
In conclusion, the district court properly decided that Lake 
Temp is subject to CWA jurisdiction because it is “within the 
description of water bodies that have traditionally been held to be 
navigable.”  In the alternative, dry portions of the lakebed meet 
the significant nexus test.  Either of these conclusions can be 
made without deciding which interpretation of Rapanos to adopt.  
If this Court decides to address the Rapanos split, it should hold 
that either test creates jurisdiction under the CWA.  Additionally, 
Lake Temp satisfies the plurality’s continuous surface connection 
test because it is a relatively permanent body of water forming a 
lake.  The District Court decision regarding the navigability of 
Lake Temp should be affirmed. 
III. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED 
THAT THE CORPS PROPERLY ISSUED A CWA 
§ 404 PERMIT. 
Under the CWA, only the Corps has authority to issue 
discharge permits under § 404, and both the Corps’ and EPA’s 
interpretations are consistent with this understanding of the 
statute.  Moreover, the slurry that DOD proposes to discharge 
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falls squarely within the definition of fill material that both 
agencies have promulgated.  As a result, the district court was 
correct in holding that the permit was properly issued under § 
404. 
A. When the Corps has authority to issue a CWA § 404 
discharge permit, EPA does not have concurrent 
authority to issue a CWA § 402 discharge permit. 
“The [Clean Water] Act is best understood to provide that if 
the Corps has authority to issue a permit for a discharge under § 
404, then . . . EPA lacks authority to do so under [section] 402.”  
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 
2458, 2467 (2009).  The CWA grants both the Corps and EPA 
regulatory authority under a dual-permitting scheme. 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1342(a)(1), 1344(a).  The Corps has authority to grant permits 
for discharges of “fill material,” and EPA has authority to grant 
permits for discharges of pollutants. Id.  Specifically, EPA may 
issue permits for the discharge of any pollutant, “[e]xcept as 
provided in section . . . 1344.” Id.  As a result, Congress carved 
out an explicit exception to EPA’s otherwise broad permitting 
authority under CWA § 402. 
When interpreting an individual statute, specific language 
controls over more general language. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 335 (2002); 
MacEvoy v. United States, 322 U.S. 103, 107 (1944).  The plain 
text of the statute prohibits EPA from issuing permits for actions 
properly under the jurisdiction of the Corps pursuant to CWA § 
404, regardless of whether a “fill material” can also be classified 
as a pollutant. 
B. The Corps’ authority to issue permits for 
discharges of fill material is consistent with both 
agencies’ interpretation of the CWA. 
If the Court finds the plain language of the CWA to be 
ambiguous, then the court should look to the agencies’ 
interpretation of the statute to resolve the ambiguity. See, e.g., 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (“Agencies delegated rulemaking 
authority under a statute such as the Clean Water Act are 
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afforded generous leeway in interpreting the statute they are 
entrusted to administer.”) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
842-45 (1984)).  As a result, decisions of the agencies charged 
with administering the CWA are entitled to deference. 
Throughout the history of the CWA, the Corps and EPA have 
issued rulemakings and other pronouncements demonstrating a 
joint understanding that the Corps—and not EPA—has authority 
to issue permits for “discharges of fill material.”  Soon after the 
CWA was enacted in 1972, EPA issued a regulation that states 
“[d]redged or fill material discharged into navigable waters” does 
“not require an NPDES permit.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.4(d) (1973).  
Today’s regulations are similar. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (2011) (Section 
402 permits are not required for “[d]ischarges of . . . fill material 
into waters of the United States which are regulated under 
section 404 of CWA.”).  Both agencies also stated in 1986 that 
discharges meeting the definition of “fill material” are regulated 
under § 404, even if they also have to meet the criteria of a § 402 
discharge. 51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (March 14, 1986).  Finally, both 
agencies stated in the preamble to the 2002 fill rule that effluent 
guidelines promulgated under §§ 304 and 306 applied to § 402 
permits and that “EPA has never sought to regulate fill material 
under effluent guidelines.” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,135 (May 9, 
2002). 
Both the Corps and EPA provided explanations for this 
division of authority.  According to both expert agencies charged 
with implementing the CWA, the permitting regime under § 404 
is fundamentally different by design. 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 21,293 
(April 20, 2000).  First, § 404 was written by Congress specifically 
to regulate dredged material and fill material. Id.  Additionally, 
“fill material” is different from the broad category of pollutants 
regulated under § 402 “because the principal environmental 
concern [of fill permits] is the loss of the water body itself.” Id.  
Additionally, Congress intended for § 404 to be the “vehicle for 
regulating materials whose effects include the physical 
conversion of waters to non-waters or other physical alterations 
of aquatic habitat[.]” Id. 
EPA is not shut out of the Corps decision to issue a permit 
under § 404.  Section 404 directs the Corps to specify each 
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disposal site for discharge permits through guidelines developed 
by EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1).  These guidelines, codified in 40 
C.F.R. § 230 (2011), ensure that “fill materials” are not 
discharged without the applicant demonstrating that a limited 
impact on the aquatic ecosystem. 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(c).  For 
example, the guidelines direct the Corps to review practicable 
alternatives to the proposed discharge, meaning no discharge at 
all or “discharging into an alternative aquatic site with 
potentially less damaging consequences[.]” Id. § 230.5(c). 
Furthermore, Congress provided EPA a significant check on 
the Corps § 404 permitting authority.  Section 404(c) of the CWA 
provides the EPA with the authority to “deny or restrict the use 
of any defined area for specification . . . as a disposal site[.]”  This 
provision is known as the EPA veto. Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2465.  
The guidelines and veto provision show that the Corps is required 
to apply EPA guidelines when deciding to issue a § 404 permit, 
but the decision to issue a § 404 permit remains the responsibility 
of the Corps. 
Notwithstanding the EPA guidelines and veto option, the 
underlying conclusion of the rulemakings and agency 
pronouncements mentioned above is that “discharges of fill 
material” are exclusively regulated by the Corps under § 404. 
C. The Corps has authority to issue the permit under 
§ 404, because the proposed discharge falls 
squarely within the definition of “fill material.” 
Section 404 of the CWA grants the Corps exclusive authority 
to issue permits for discharges of dredged or “fill material.” CWA 
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006); Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2467-69.  
Congress did not provide a definition in the CWA for “fill 
material.”  However, the agencies have promulgated a rule to 
bridge the gap left by Congress, which defines “fill material” as  
“material placed in waters of the United States where the 
material has the effect of (i) Replacing any portion of a water of 
the United States with dry land; or (ii) Changing the bottom 
elevation of any portion of a water of the United States.” 33 
C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1) (2011) (Corps definition); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 
(2011) (EPA definition).  Both agencies also provide a non-
exhaustive list of activities that qualify as a “discharge of fill 
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material.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f) (2011); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2011).  
These joint regulations explicitly state that a “discharge of fill 
material” includes “placement of overburden, slurry, or tailings or 
similar mining-related materials[.]” Id.  The decision for this 
Court, then, is to decide whether or not the agencies have 
constructed a rule that is consistent with the CWA. 
1. The agencies’ definition of fill material is 
controlling because it is a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
An agency interpretation is controlling unless plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the statute. Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452, 461 (1997).  “When a court reviews an agency’s 
construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted 
with two questions.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  It first looks at 
whether or not Congress has spoken directly to the question at 
issue, and if Congress has provided a clear answer, then that is 
the end of review, for both the agency and the court must follow 
Congressional intent. Id.  If Congress has not spoken directly to 
the question at issue, then the court must determine whether or 
not the agency’s rulemaking is a permissible construction of the 
statute. Id. 
Congress can delegate regulatory authority implicitly or 
explicitly. Id. at 843-44.  If the statutory gap is explicit, then 
courts must defer to the agency interpretation “unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute. Id. at 
844.  On the other hand, if the delegation of authority is implicit, 
then courts should defer to agency interpretations that are 
reasonable constructions of the statute. Id.  Here, the agencies’ 
interpretation of the term “fill material” is made pursuant to an 
implicit delegation. 
As a result, the current definition of “fill material” 
promulgated by the Corps and EPA is a reasonable interpretation 
that is consistent with the CWA.  In 2002, the Corps and EPA 
jointly undertook an effort to redefine the definition of “fill 
material.” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (May 9, 2002).  Before 1977, both 
agencies defined “fill material” as “any pollutant used to create 
fill in the traditional sense of replacing an aquatic area with dry 
land or of changing the bottom elevation of a water body for any 
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purpose.” Id. at 31,131.  Then, in 1977, the Corps modified the 
definition by adding a “primary purpose test,” which excluded 
discharges primarily intended to dispose of waste. Id.  EPA, on 
the other hand, defined “fill material” as any pollutant that 
replaces a water of the United States with dry land or changes its 
elevation for any purpose, retaining the effects-based definition. 
Id. 
The agencies explained that the effects-based approach was 
selected over the “primary purpose” approach because of the 
difficulty of making subjective determinations regarding the 
purpose of potential discharges. 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,294 (April 20, 
2000).  The agencies reasoned that adopting an effects-based test 
would provide for more objective decisions on whether to issue § 
404 permits, as well as more consistent results. Id. at 21,294-95.  
Accordingly, the effects-based definition that the agencies have in 
place today is a reasonable interpretation of term “fill material.” 
2. The proposed discharge meets the test set out 
by the Supreme Court in Coeur Alaska, Inc. 
Moreover, New Union’s attempt to distinguish the discharge 
of fill material in this case from the discharge of fill material 
described in Coeur falls flat.  There, the defendant-mine operator 
received a § 404 permit to discharge slurry from a mining 
operation into a treatment lake. Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2463-64.  
Ruling for the defendant, though, the Supreme Court explained 
that the mining slurry at issue “falls well within the central 
understanding of the term ‘fill’” and noted that the plaintiff had 
even conceded that point. Id. at 2468.  The plaintiff raised a 
concern that this “interpretation of the statute will lead to 
[section] 404 permits authorizing the discharges of solids [e.g., 
litter and battery manufacturing waste,] that are now restricted 
by EPA standards.” Id. 
The Court responded that those “extreme instances” were not 
in front of the court and hinted at a potential exception to the 
effects-based definition of “fill” by stating that, “the dispositive 
question for future cases would be whether the solid at issue . . . 
came within the regulation’s definition of “fill.” Id.  The proposed 
discharge by DOD is not one of those instances. 
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The munitions slurry in this case is not the same category as 
the mining slurry from Coeur, however the slurry is still well 
within the definition of “fill material.”  Later in the Coeur 
opinion, the Court deferred to EPA’s conclusion that CWA § 
306(e) performance standards did not apply to permits issued 
under § 404. Id. at 2473.  Relying on an internal EPA opinion, the 
Court noted that “the instant cases do not present a process or 
plan designed to manipulate the outer boundaries of the 
definition of ‘fill material’ by labeling minute quantities of EPA-
regulated solids as fill.” Id.  Nor does DOD’s proposed discharge 
of munitions slurry.  The record establishes that the munitions 
project will have the effect of changing the bottom elevation of 
Lake Temp.  The project will raise the entire lakebed by an 
estimated six feet, resulting in a two square mile increase in the 
surface area of the lake. Order at 4.  As a result, DOD cannot be 
accused of proposing a discharge plan that intends to manipulate 
the outer boundaries of what constitutes “fill material.” 
3. The legislative history and an earlier 
congressional statute regulating fill material 
also support the conclusion that the proposed 
munitions discharge falls within the definition 
of fill material. 
New Union suggests that, because some of the materials in 
the munitions slurry are toxic pollutants, DOD’s proposed 
discharge is different from the fill discharged in Coeur. Order at 
8.  But the legislative history shows that Congress intended for 
discharges of “fill material” to be regulated by the Corps under 
section 404, regardless of whether the fill material contained 
toxic substances or not.  In a Senate Report discussing the 1977 
amendments to the Clean Water Act of 1977, Congress stated: 
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972 required a permit program to control the 
adverse effects caused by point source discharges of dredged or 
fill material into the navigable waters including: (1) the 
destruction and degradation of aquatic resources that results 
from replacing water with dredged material or fill material; and 
(2) the contamination of water resources with dredged or fill 
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material that contains toxic substances. The committee 
amendment is designed to reaffirm this intent[.] 
S. Rep. No. 95-370, at 74 (1977).  Based on this report, Congress 
foresaw the possibility that discharges of fill material could 
contain toxic substances or destroy aquatic resources. 
Furthermore, the Corps’ authority set out in the Rivers and 
Harbors Act (RHA), the statutory predecessor to the CWA, is also 
analogous to the current regulatory regime.  Under the RHA, the 
Corps has authority to regulate discharges of fill. 33 U.S.C. § 403 
(2006).  The Fourth Circuit held that RHA § 10 was “sufficiently 
broad to prohibit the discharge of any fill material, including 
waste, that would ‘alter or modify the course, location, condition, 
or capacity’ of designated navigable waters.” Kentuckians for the 
Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 442 (2003) (citations 
omitted).  The court rejected a definition of “fill material” limited 
only to “material deposited for some beneficial primary purpose.” 
Id.  It follows then, that, regardless of the presence of toxic 
pollutants in DOD’s proposed slurry, the discharge falls within 
the definition of “fill material,” because it has the effect of 
changing the bottom elevation of Lake Temp. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED 
THAT EPA’S DECISION DID NOT VIOLATE 
THE CWA. 
The district court properly upheld EPA’s decision not to veto 
the Corps permit.  The EPA, Corps, and Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) acted appropriately under the CWA’s veto 
provision. CWA’s § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006). 
A.   EPA properly consulted with the Corps under 
CWA § 404(c). 
EPA’s decision not to veto the permit was taken pursuant to 
CWA § 404(c), which reads: “Before [a veto] determination, the 
[EPA] Administrator shall consult with the Secretary [of the 
Army].” Id.  This provision is an explicit statutory mandate for 
EPA to work with the Corps in evaluating the situation before 
making a veto determination.  OMB facilitated the consultation 
process between EPA and the Corps.  OMB’s participation in this 
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process supported the consultation effort between EPA and the 
Corps.  Thus, because the consultation process is sanctioned by 
the CWA, EPA’s participation in the consultation process was 
proper. 
B.   In the alternative, EPA’s decision not to veto the 
permit is not subject to judicial review. 
In the alternative, EPA’s decision not veto the permit is a 
wholly discretionary action and not subject to judicial review.  
The Administrative Procedures Act exempts from judicial review 
an “agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by 
law.” 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(2).  “[A]n agency’s decision not to take 
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial 
review under § 701(a)(2).” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 
(1985).  EPA’s decision not to veto the permit was a decision not 
to take enforcement action.  Thus, the EPA’s decision not to veto 
the permit is presumed immune from judicial review and should 
be upheld.  As the district court aptly noted: “The participation by 
OMB in EPA’s decision did not violate the CWA, [and] did not 
make EPA’s decision subject to judicial review[.]” Order at 10. 
C.  Even if EPA’s decision was subject to judicial 
review, the decision not to veto the permit was not 
arbitrary or capricious. 
In the alternative, EPA’s decision not to veto the permit 
should be upheld under the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.  EPA’s decision 
under CWA § 404(c) should only be found unlawful if “agency 
action, findings, and conclusions” are “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006).  EPA’s decision was not arbitrary or 
capricious because it is consistent with existing case law, 
including Coeur, and a reasonable exercise of the President’s 
constitutional Article II powers.  Accordingly, this Court should 
hold that EPA’s actions were legal under the Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
1. EPA’s actions were consistent with the 
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Coeur. 
EPA’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious because they 
were consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Coeur.  In 
Coeur, the Court held that the Corps has exclusive jurisdiction to 
issue permits for fill materials under CWA § 404. Coeur, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2468.  EPA does not have authority to issue permits that 
involve fill materials, but EPA may, in its discretion, veto a 
permit issued by the Corps if inconsistent with conservation 
priorities identified in the statute.  Accordingly, EPA’s 
discretionary decision not a veto a Corps permit is consistent with 
the limited authority that the Supreme Court found was given to 
EPA in Coeur. 
2. OMB’s involvement in the EPA-Corps 
consultation is not arbitrary or  capricious. 
EPA’s decision not to veto the permit was taken pursuant to 
CWA § 404(c), which reads: “Before [a veto] determination, the 
[EPA] Administrator shall consult with the Secretary [of the 
Army].” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006).  This provision is a mandate 
for EPA to work with the Corps in evaluating the situation before 
making a veto determination.  The consultation process between 
EPA and the Corps was facilitated by OMB.  OMB’s participation 
in this process supported the consultation effort between EPA 
and the Corps.  The Executive Branch’s use of a third-party 
agency to aid statutorily-mandated consultation is neither 
arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.  Thus, because 
the consultation process is sanctioned by the CWA and OMB’s 
participation in the consultation process was a proper way to 
support EPA’s consultation reasonability, EPA’s decision not to 
veto the permit was appropriate. 
3. The President is empowered by the 
Constitution to decide how to arbitrate 
disputes between executive branch agencies. 
EPA’s decision not to veto the permit was not arbitrary or 
capricious because the executive power of the United States is 
vested in the President. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.  The 
President is charged with duty to “take Care that the Laws be 
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faithfully executed.” Id. art. II, § 3.  This clause gives the 
president the power to make decisions on any discretionary issue 
reaching the executive branch, including conflicts between laws 
and agencies.  Thus, the Constitution gives the President the 
power to resolve disputes between federal agencies in whatever 
way she sees fit, including delegating the responsibility to a third 
agency such as OMB. 
In conclusion, EPA’s decision not to veto the permit did not 
violate the CWA because the statute mandated the consultation, 
or in the alternative, the decision is not subject to judicial review, 
or the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
The district court property held that New Union does not 
have standing to contest the corps’ issuance of a CWA § 404 
permit.  New Union lacks traditional Article III standing.  New 
Union’s claimed injury is neither actual nor imminent under the 
traditional standing test, or the relaxed standard from 
Massachusetts.  Nor does New Union have standing under a 
theory of parens patriae.  New Union’s failure to object to issues 
that should have been raised in the EIS process estopps it from 
seeking judicial review of the Corps’ decision to issue a § 404 
permit. 
The district court properly decided that Lake Temp is subject 
to CWA jurisdiction.  The district court correctly held that Lake 
Temp is “within the description of water bodies that have 
traditionally been held to be navigable.”  The lakebed, where the 
Corps’ project will take place, is subject to CWA jurisdiction. 
In the alternative, if the Court finds that the lake is 
navigable in fact and the dry portions of the lakebed are not a 
part of the lake, then the dry portions of the lakebed meet the 
significant nexus test.  In the alternative, if the Court finds that 
the lake is not navigable in fact, then either of the Rapanos tests 
may be used to establish jurisdiction.  Lake Temp is a relatively 
permanent body of water and thus meets the Rapanos plurality’s 
test. 
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The lower court correctly decided that the Corps properly 
issued a CWA § 404 permit.  When the Corps has authority to 
issue a CWA § 404 discharge permit, EPA does not have 
concurrent authority to issue a CWA § 402 discharge permit.  The 
Corps’ authority to issue permits for discharges of fill material is 
consistent with both agencies’ interpretation of the CWA. 
The Corps has authority to issue the permit under § 404, 
because the proposed discharge falls squarely within the 
definition of “fill material.”  The agencies’ definition of fill 
material is controlling because it is a permissible construction of 
the statute.  The proposed discharge meets the test set out by the 
Supreme Court in Coeur.  The legislative history and an earlier 
congressional statute regulating fill material also supports the 
conclusion that the proposed munitions discharge falls within the 
definition of fill material. 
The district court correctly decided that EPA’s decision did 
not violate the CWA.  EPA properly consulted with the Corps 
under CWA § 404(c).  In the alternative, EPA’s decision not to 
veto the permit is not subject to judicial review. 
Even if EPA’s decision were subject to judicial review, the 
decision not to veto the permit was not arbitrary or capricious.  
EPA’s actions were consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Coeur.  OMB’s involvement in the EPA-Corps consultation is not 
arbitrary or capricious.  The President is empowered by the 
Constitution to decide how to arbitrate disputes between 
executive branch agencies. 
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